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Kohlberg's theory of moral development suggests moral 
reasoning develops in stages. It argues that because moral reasoning 
clearly is reasoning, sophisticated moral reasoning must 
sophisticated logical reasoning. It also proposes that advances in 
moral judgment are an outcome of social development, that is, the 
ability to put oneseif in another's place. Kohlberg's theory 
hypothesizes that cognitive development is necessary but not suffic1ent 
for social development, and social development is necessary but not 
sufficient for moral development. 
The present research tested Kohlber's assumptions by examining 
cognitive, social, and moral development in deaf individuals. According 
to the literature, cognitive and social development of deaf persons is 
delayed compared to hearing individuals. According to Kohlberg's 
theory, such delays should lead to delays in the development of moral 
reasoning. 
Previous assessments of the functioning of deaf individuals have 
typ1cally been conducted in English, even though English is not the 
native tongue of deaf Americans. The present research modified typical 
assessment methods by employing both American S1gn Language and English 
in order to minimize possible constraints on performance due to problems 
with English. The modified procedures were checked with hearing 
individuals. 
Results were that deaf participants were delayed cognitively and 
morally when compared with hearing peers. Interestingly, one third of 
deaf participants showed moral reasoning at higher levels than 
Kohlberg's theory says their cognitive development should have allowed. 
The research also presents an alternative method for making group 
assessments 
individuals. 
of the moral development ot both deaf and hearing 
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CHAPTER I 
.INTRODUCTION 
Historically, there have been three philosophical perspectives 
regarding the basic nature ot cnildren. The doctrine of ori~inal sin, 
as espoused by Hobbes (1651), has held that the basic goal of humans is 
to enhance the ego by attaining power and mastery over others. This 
desire in children is generally thwarted by adults who try to mold those 
tendencies toward socially approved outlets. This view is represented 
in current psychology by Freudian theory. 
The doctrine of tabula xaaa, as propounded by Locke (1690), has 
suggested that the child is inherently neither good nor bad, but rather 
is flexible and may develop socially desirable or undesirable habits 
depending upon life experience. This pos1tion is represented today by 
modern learning theory. 
The third perspective, from Rousseau and Kant, is the doctrine of 
innate purity, which holds that there is a fundamental goodness in 
children which society may foster or corrupt. This viewpoint has been 
adopted by the cognitive-developmental approach. 
In keep1ng with its philosophical underpinnings, each approach has 
its own definition of what constitutes morality, with each definition 
influenc1ng areas of research. Freudians hold that moral values are the 
internalized standards which have been received from socializing agents. 
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Research has concentrated chiefly on feelings of guilt which arise when 
these standards are violated. Learning theory defines morality in terms 
ot specific behaviors which are acquired and maintained through learning 
principles. Research has focused on determining which situations and 
which schedules of reinforcement influence behaviors that are judged by 
some shared standard of conduct. The cognitive-developmental approach 
defines morality in terms of conscious judgments of right and wrong. 
Research has centered on uncovering cognitive processes which are 
presumed to underlie moral reasoning. 
The present paper looks at the development of moral reasoning in 
deaf individuals from a cognitive-developmental perspective. 
There are a number of common attributes which the various cognitive 
developmental theories of morality share (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 
1932; Turiel, 1975). The most obvious ot these is the assumption that 
moral development occurs in stages, i.e., levels of functioning which 
are qualitatively different, with stages organized hierarchically such 
that later stages incorporate earlier ones. A second shared 
characteristic is the belief that moral development has a cognitive 
component. Third is that the fundament~l motivation for morality is 
generated internally, concurrent with general incentives to achieve and 
be competent, rather than for answering biological needs or reducing 
aversive stimuli such as fear. Fourth, major aspects of morality are 
universal; i.e., there are common sources of soc1al interaction such as 
role taking and social conflict in all cultures. Fifth, basic moral 
principles come from social experience. And finally, the overall 
quality and scope of cognitive and social stimulation are 
influential than are specific experiences (Kohlberg, 1976). 
3 
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Tne leading cognitive theory today is Kohlberg's (1969; 1976) 
revis1on and extension ot Piaget's (1932) theory ot the development of 
moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory is based upon, and is best 
understood in relation to, Piaget's theory of cognitive development. 
Pia~et's Theory 
Piaget (1970) believes that from the most elementary behavior of 
intants to the most sophisticated intellectual activity ot adults, 
knowledge is linked with actions and mental operations. Knowledge does 
not come from objects, nor from subject, but from interactions between 
subject and objects. The subject must act upon objects and transform 
them, e.g., "displace, connect, combine, take apart, and reassemble 
them" (P1aget, 1970, p. 704). Piaget suggested that biological growth, 
and this includes cognitive development, does not occur by simply adding 
something to an organism from outside, but corresponds to the nature of 
the organism. When he speaks of an organism, be implies that there is 
some structure which is responsible to its environment, a structure 
which maintains itself and preserves its integrity by factors which are 
not entirely intrinsic. We may observe what appears to be spontaneous 
activity by an organism, but such activity is not arbitrary, not 
separate from lawful determination, because intrinsic spontaneity is 
constrained by the lawful structure of the organism. Therefore, a 
reaction is not solely a response to an external stimulus but reflects 
also the working ot underlying structure. 
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To understand behavior, then, the underlying structures must be 
examined. Piaget inferred changes in structure by examining changes in 
behavior. By observing children's changing responses, he constructed 
his cognitive developmental theory. 
~ Concepts 
Piaget's theory contains several key concepts which must be 
understood. Among them is the distinction between cognitiv~ structure, 
cognitive content, and cognitive function. 
Cognitive structure. By cognitive structure, Piaget means the 
pattern, shape, or form that cognitive activity takes during 
development. Each stage of cognitive development bas its own unique set 
of structures which regulates cognitive activity. As Brainerd (1978) 
emphasized, Piaget views these structures as existing, not simply as 
constructs. In essence, cognitive structures are the common properties 
ot intellectual activity at a given stage of development. 
There are two forms ot cognitive structure, called schemes and 
operations. A scheme involves s1milar action sequences and is more than 
s1mply the behavior. Rather, it is the underlying organization of 
similar action sequences. Schemes begin early, rather as sensory motor 
equ1valents ot concepts. For each motor activity, there is a scheme. 
As a child develops, schemes become interrelated so that increasingly 
complicated activity is possible. 
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When schemes become sufficiently sophisticated, they no longer need 
be expressed overtly. When that happens, they are classified as 
operations. For Piaget (1963), every thought was once an action. 
Operations are therefore internalized schemes. Just as operations form 
from schemes in childhood, higher-order operations form from operations 
in adolescence. 
Cggnjtjye cgntent. Unlike structure, cognitive content may be 
measured directly. Content changes with experience and structural. 
reorganization. Content is behavior. 
Cggnjtjye function. Structure and content change with experience. 
Cognitive functions are invariant. P1aget postulated two invariant 
functions, organization and adaptation, which are complementary. 
Organization refers to the tendency ot cognitive structures to cohere 
into higher-order systems. 
separate structures for 
To illustrate, in infancy there may be 
looking at objects and for grasping objects. 
During development these two schemes combine into a higher-order 
structure which allows visually directed reaching. Presumably, 
organization is respons1ble for continuity of cognitive activity; 
intelligent behavior has a degree of sameness, with coherent, 
discernible patterns over time. 
But there is also discontinuity, the result of adaptation. 
argued that as experience changes cognitive structure it also changes 
content because what is known cannot be separated from the underlying 
structures. The two facets of adaptation are assimilation and 
accommodation. 
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Assimilation refers to transformation of information to fit into 
existing cognitive structures. Scimuli are always interpreted in a 
manner which is congruent with current structures. A stimulus which 
cannot be ass1milated does not exist. In essence, cognitive structures 
make sense out of incoming information; the sense that arises depends 
upon existing structures. 
Accommodation, on the other hand, involves changes in structures to 
better fit incoming information. Piaget suggests that there are limits 
on how much information may be assimilated during each stage of 
development. When these limits are reached, structural change, 
accommodation, is required and cognitive development occurs. 
Assimilation and accommodation are complementary processes. 
Assimilation ensures continuation of existing structures but permits no 
variations of structure and precludes development. Likewise, 
accommodation cannot exist alone; it can occur only within the limits 
which preserve assimilatory capacity of structure. For 
cognitive development consists ot increasingly sophisticated equ1librium 
or balance between assimilation and accommodation. Equ1librium is 
possible at each stage of development. 
Sta~es QX Development 
Piaget does not see cognitive development as continuous and 
quantitative improvements in processes that remain invariant during the 
life span. Instead, he writes of development as qualitative changes in 
structures. These changes separate four stages of what Brainerd (1976) 
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called "natural groupings." To say that a child is at a particular stage 
ot development is to say that a particular set of structures exists. By 
stages, Piaget refers to the lawful succession ot relatively stable 
structures which characterize behavior. Successive structures 
incorporate, enrich, and extend earlier ones. 
More formally, there are four criteria of Piagetian stages. First, 
each stage is comprised of two parts, a period of preparation when the 
structures are being formed and a period of achievement or consolidation 
when the structures are operating and assimilation and accommodation are 
in relative balance. Second, each structure is at the same time the 
achievement ot one stage and the starting point of the succeeding stage. 
Third, transition from one stage to the next involves the 
integration of preceding structures into the new structure. And fourth, 
the order ot stages is invariant. Rate ot progression may vary, 
depending upon such factors as environmental demands, motivation, and 
opportunity, but no stage may be skipped (Inhelder, 1981). 
Piaget (e.g., 1976) proposed four global stages of cognitive 
development. They are, in order of appearance, sensory-motor, 
preoperations, concrete operations, and formal operations. 
Sensory-motpr ~· This first stage lasts from birth to 
approximately the advent of language, i.e., to about 18 to 24 months. 
The major characteristic of sensory-motor intelligence is profound 
egocentrism, a state wherein the infant and the external world are one. 
The structures do not separate the self from objects and events. Thus, 
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infants are not aware that objects ha~e independent existence and have 
no sense ot the self as an entity. Piaget argued that infants are 
intelligent but are not thoughtful because "thought is interiorized 
intelligence no longer based on direct action but on • 
(1976, P• 11) • 
symbolism" 
Preoperations. The hallmark of the advent of the second stage of 
development is symbolic functioning, the essence of which is that absent 
oojects and events can be mentally represented. Preoperations lasts 
until approximately age seven. Piaget suggests that thought is the 
internalization of overt action schemes which characterized the previous 
stage. Thus, 
unsophisticated 
preoperational children can think, although it is rather 
thought by adult standards. While the child has 
thought, there are no operations, the defining characteristic of which 
is that they are reversible. Piaget argued that preoperational thought, 
i.e., interiorized action, is a necessary precursor for operations. 
Concrete operations. Around the age of seven comes what Piaget 
sees as a fundamental turning point in development. The child now 
becomes capable of a certain logic as operations can be combined in 
revers1ble thought. Where the preoperational child has acqu1red 
intuitive thought, i.e., thought which lacks rigorous, logical, and 
deductive properties, concrete thinking has these properties. 
limitation ot this stage is that operations are bound by 
The major 
tangible 
information. 
verbal statements but 
suggested that concrete logic is not based upon 
only on observable properties of manipulable 
objects. Thus, there will be logic based on classifications, relations, 
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and numbers, but not on propositions. 
The concrete operational child has acquired an understanding of the 
principles of conservation and perspective-taking, i.e., that changes in 
systems can compensate for one another so long as nothing is added nor 
taken away and that seeing and understanding objects and events depends 
upon both phys1cal and psychological points of view (Cowan, 1978). 
Formal operations. The highest level of cognitive functioning 
begins about the age of 11 or 12 years, with a preparation phase of 2 to 
4 years. Achievement may come as early as age 13 "in rich cultural 
environments" (Inhelder, 1981, p. 31). The formal thinker is no longer 
tied to the here and now; rather, the adolescent is able to form 
hypotheses and deduce possible consequences. He or she is able to 
transcend the present to handle complex problems of reasoning (G1nsburg 
& Opper, 1969). Reality is secondary to possibility. When facing a 
scientific problem, the formal thinker does not begin by observing 
empirical results, but by imagining the possibilities which are inherent 
in the s1tuation: many things might occur, many interpretations might 
be feasible, there are many possibilities. 
According to Piaget, a new logic is now possible. A whole set of 
specific operations is superimposed on previous ones, the result being a 
logic of propositions. As Flavell (1977) observed, to reason that one 
proposition logically implies another involves reasoning about 
propos1tions, not about any empirical phenomena to which the statements 
might refer. Indeed, propositions may or may not be factual, may not 
refer to real objects or events, may not refer to anything at all. Yet 
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the formal thinker can reason about propositions because formal 
operations are not limited to reality. 
Thus, where concrete operations are "first degree" operations, 
dealing with reality, formal operations are "second degree" operations 
that handle propositions which are generated by first degree operations 
(Inhelder & P1aget, 1958). The formal thinker is able to think about 
thinking itself, rather than being limited to thinking about objects. 
In conceptualizing logic, the distinction is frequently made 
between deduction and induction. Deduction involves reasoning from the 
general to the particular; induction is reasoning from the particular to 
the general. According to Piaget, a young child's reasoning is neither 
deductive rior inductive but is transductiye, i.e., reasoning from 
particular to particular without considering the general. The young 
child seemd unable to abstract salient features in making general 
classifications. Instead, classification involves the linking of events 
on the basis of common features which may not be held constant. For 
example, when a four-year-old is asked to classify large and small 
circles and squares which are red and blue the result is typically one 
class, the link being size, shape, and color. Transductive reasoning is 
thus responsible for a child's referring to all four-legged animals as, 
for example, dogs, because.he or she is not able to abstract and hold 
constant the salient particulars which form the basis for the concept of 
dog. 
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P1aget believes that the ability to form concepts is a function of 
mental imagery and signification. The essential characteristic ot 
signification is the recognition that the signifier is different from 
what it stands for (the significate) but still represents it. 
Signifiers do not refer to things but to one's knowledge of things. The 
two types of signifiers are signs and symbols. Signs derive their 
meaning from social agreement. Symbols, however, are idiosyncratic and 
generally resemble their significates. Piaget argued that symbols 
initially represent schemes. Symbol construction is thus an outgrowth 
of imitation, first external, then internal, and the internal symbol is 
a mental image. These images play an important role in a young 
thinking because they allow a child to deal with 
representations instead of real events. Images also allow a 
child's 
symbolic 
child to 
anticipate future events, ruminate on past events, and plan future 
activities. 
The child also acquires signs, the most common of which are words. 
At first, a child employs words to represent current events, and these 
early signs are used much like symbols; i.e., there is personal meaning, 
as if there were no understanding as to the social nature of words. 
Piaget believes that language plays a relatively limited role in the 
formation of a child's thinking. Much preoperational thinking is 
non-verbal. Words are used primarily as a running commentary on ongoing 
behavior and thinking processes. Thus, a child's thought depends less 
on language than language does on thought. 
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The young child's speech is largely egocentric. Piaget suggested 
that egocentric speech diminishes as the child has more social contact 
with peers. Parents typically understand the young child's symbolic use 
of signs, but other children do not. In order to make himself 
understood, a child must begin to take into account the soc1al nature of 
words. According to Piaget, this does not happen until late 
preoperations, and it is a function of increases in social interactions 
with peers. 
~ Development 
For Piaget (1932), morality involves respect for social rules and a 
sense of justice. Social rules are the laws, standards, and moral 
principles which regulate 
reciprocity and equality 
behavior; justice 
among individuals. 
means a concern for 
Piaget's theory of moral 
development proposes two stages plus a premoral period, to about age 4 
or 5, during which there is little understanding of or concern for 
social rules. The first stage, known variously as moral realism, moral 
constraint, or heteronomous morality, is a time when children feel 
obliged to conform to rules because rules are believed to have arisen 
from divine, or at least parental inspiration, and are thus sacred and 
immutable. Behavior is seen as either right or wrong, and judgments are 
based upon the magnitude of consequences, the degree to which behavior 
conforms to known rules, and whether or not the behavior leads to 
punishment. The heteronomous child also believes in immanent justice, 
i.e., that transgressions will always be punished, by God or natural 
forces if not by parents. 
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By age 10 or 11, children enter the second stage, called autonomous 
morality or moral relativism. The child understands that rules are 
arbitrary. Moral judgments now reflect perceived intent. Duty involves 
less obedience to authority and more obedience to expectations of peers. 
Piaget sees cognitive development and social interaction as causes 
of moral development. Cognitive development leads a child to overcome 
egocentrism and realism, i.e., difficulty in distinguishing between 
subjective and objective aspects of experience. Peer interaction 
provides opportunities for role taking and the sharing of decision 
making with peers and results in a lessening of heteronomous respect for 
adults. 
Kohlber~'s theory 
Perhaps the leading contemporary theory of moral development is 
that proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg (~.g., 1969; 1976). Like Piaget, 
Kohlberg argued that developmental change should be defined in terms of 
changes in underlying cognitive structures instead of overt behavior and 
that development occurs in stages. He is interested in the development 
of moral reasoning rather than moral behavior. His theory stresses a 
growing appreciation of the concept of justice, i.e., relations of 
liberty, equality, reciprocity, and contracts. Kohlberg argued that 
"one can act morally and question all rules, one may act morally and 
question the greater good, but one cannot act morally and question the 
need for justice" (1976, p. 40). 
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Kohlberg's research has revolved around the presentation of series 
of moral dilemmas for which there are no right or wrong answers. Each 
dilemma presents a hypothetical story which requ1res subjects to choose 
between obedience-serving acts, e.g., obeying a rule or command from 
authority, and need-serving behaviors, e.g., proposing actions which 
conflict with rules while fulfilling some human need (Hoffman, 1970). 
Kohlberg is not concerned with judgments per se but with the reasoning 
which underlies the judgments. Based upon results of these interviews, 
Kohlberg has proposed six stages of moral reasoning with each stage 
being more sophisticated and complicated than its predecessor and 
requiring increasingly refined distinctions. The trend is away from a 
morality of constraint and toward a morality ot reciprocity, a process 
which is made possible by a developing capacity for assuming the roles 
of others. 
Hogan and Emler (1978) suggested that the most distinctive feature 
of Kohlberg's theory is his assertion that each higher stage is the 
basis for the emergence of more comprehensive principlea of justice. 
Development involves external and internal conflict. External conflict 
stems from competition with others for resources; internal conflict is 
the result of cognitive dissatisfaction due to contradictions of one's 
own reasoning. The solution to these conflicts "is found in principles 
that resolve competing claims and transcent contradictions, and this 
resolution means that a child moves to a higher stage ot reasoning. 
Each successive stage is built upon moral principles capable of 
resolving an ever wider range of contlicts" (Hogan & Emler, 1978, P• 
215). 
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The relationship between cognitive development and moral 
development is essential to Kohlberg's theory. He argued that because 
11moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends 
upon advanced logical reasoning11 (1976, P• 32). Therefore, if one 
assumes that there are stages in cognitive development, as Kohlberg 
does, then one is led to the conclusion that there must be stages in the 
development of moral reasoning. 
Kohlberg asserted that there is a parallel relationship between 
cognitive and moral stages. For example, the concrete operational child 
will not have acqu1red abstract reasoning skills which are necessary for 
the highest stages of moral development. Yet, while logical development 
is viewed as a necessary condition for moral development, it is not 
sufficient. Kohlberg reported that many persons are at higher cognitive 
stages than the corresponding moral stages, but 11essentially none 
are at a higher moral stage than their logical stage11 (1976, P• 
• 
32). 
Kohlberg also suggested that there is a relationship between the 
evolution of social perspective or role-taking ability and moral 
judgment. He stressed the importance of social stimulation, which comes 
from social interaction, moral d1alogue, moral decision-making, and 
moral interaction, and calls such experience role-taking opportunities. 
He prefers Mead's (1932) term, role taking, to the more typical term, 
empathy, because the former connotes cognition as well as affect, it 
implies an understanding of an organization among ail societal roles, 
and it emphasizes that role taking occurs in all social interactions. 
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The level at which an indiviaual is able to interpret the feelings 
and thoughts of others has direct bearing on reasoning about fairness or 
right and wrong. Social perception development follows cognitive 
development and precedes moral development. Kohlberg believes that 
there is a horizontal sequence of steps from equ1valent levels of logic 
to social perspective to moral reasoning. For example, an individual 
who attains the preparation phase of formal operations presumably is 
able to see global systems at work. This ability will lead to the 
social perspective of being able to comprehend the mutual understanding 
of members of society regarding their roles in that society. Then, and 
only then, could come the stage of moral development where the order and 
well-being of the social system are focal points for decisions about 
right and wrong. 
There is one final step to this sequence. Kohlberg sees moral 
behavior as following moral reasoning. He argues that an individual 
will have a d1fficult time following the highest moral standards without 
understanding them or believing in them. Thus, 
behavior seems to require principled moral reasoning. 
principled moral 
The reverse is 
not true, however, because Kohlberg wrote that it is easy to visualize 
individuals who can reason at high moral levels not behaving in keeping 
with those standards. There are many factors which influence whether 
someone will follow the d1ctates of conscience. Moral judgment level 
may allow moral behavior, but it does not guarantee it. 
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Kohlberg proposed that there are six stages in the development of 
moral reasoning, ordered into three major levels. The descriptions 
which follow are based upon Kohlberg (1969; 1976). 
~ ~ Preconyentjonal Morality 
Kohlberg suggested that preconventional morality is the level of 
most children under age 9. Contro! of behavior is primarily externa! 
because the moral rules conformed to are in response to the power of 
rule-makers, e.g., parents, and the motivation to follow these rules 
stems from a desire to avoid sanctions for rule-breaking and to obtain 
externally administered rewards for compliance • 
.5.t.a.ge. ll. Heteronomous mpral i ty. There is an orientation toward 
obedience and punishment during this first stage. The physical 
consequences of actions and an objective interpretation of degree of 
divergence from established norms or adult commands determine whether 
the behavior is bad or good. 
reason for doing right is 
What is right is not breaking 
to avoid punishment. From 
perspective, there is egocentrism. The child does not 
rules; the 
a SOC1al 
consider 
intentions which underlie behaviors, cannot see others' points of view, 
and confuses authorityrs perspective with his or her own. 
~ 2...:.. Indjyjdual ism. instrumental pnrppse. awl. exchange. Here 
there is a naively egoistic orientation. What is right is what 
satisfies personal needs and, occasionally, the needs ot others. Right 
is also what's fair, as in an exchange or agreement. The reason for 
doing right rests in serving one's own needs while recognizing that 
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others have their own needs. From a social point of view, right is 
relative because interests may differ and conflict. 
~ ~ Conyentional Morality 
Kohlberg considers this to be t~e level of most adolescents and 
adults in most societies. Morality is defined in terms of committing 
good acts, maintaining the social order, and meeting the expectations of 
others. Control is sometimes external because the standards adhered to 
are the rules or expectations of those in authority or those for whom 
there is personal attachment. Motivation to conform, however, is 
largely internal in that it is based upon anticipated praise or censure 
by significant others. 
~ ~ Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and 
interpersonal conformity. This stage is sometimes referred to as the 
good boy or good girl stage because orientation is toward obtaining the 
approval ot others and toward helping others. Intentions are considered 
when moral judgments are made. What is right is living up to what is 
expected of you in your various roles. The reasons for doing right 
I 
include the need to think of yourself as a good person, caring for 
others, and belief in the Golden Rule. Socially, individual interests 
give way to an awareness of shared feelings, agreements, and 
expectations. 
Social system and conscience. Maintenance of the 
existing social order is of prime concern in this stage. Doing one's 
duty, showing respect for authority, and contributing to society are 
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virtues. What is right is fulfilling your duties and obeying the law. 
The motivation for doing right comes from a desire to avoid breaking 
down the social order. From a social perspective, individual relations 
are considered in terms of roles and places within the system. The 
system defines roles and places. 
~ ~ Principled,~ Postcgnyentignal 1 Morality 
Kohlberg believes that the highest level of moral reasoning is 
achieved by only a minority of adults, and then only after age 20. The 
person at this level has differentiated self from rules and expectations 
of others 
principles. 
and defines personal values in terms of self-chosen 
The possibility of conflict between two soc1ally accepted 
standards is understood. Control is internal because the standards 
followed come from personal criteria, and moral reasoning is based upon 
individual thought and judgment of right and wrong. 
£taga ~ sacial contract~ utility and indiyidual ri~hts. The 
penultimate stage is the morality of contracts, individual rights, and 
democracy. The law is the criterion for what is right; it must be 
upheld, even if it is arbitrary or unjust, until it can be changed. But 
changes must come from within the system because the system must prevail 
to provide the greater good for the greater number. What is right is 
being aware that there are many rules and values, and they are relative 
to one's own group. These values are a social contract and should be 
upheld in the interest of impartiality. Some values, however, are 
nonrelative, such as liberty and justice: These should be upheld 
regardless or majority opinion. Reasons for doing right involve a sense 
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ot obligation to law because laws exist for the general welfare. 
Socially, there is the perspective of a rational individual who is aware 
of values and rights prior to contracts or social attachments. 
~ ~ Universal ethical principles. Kohlberg's highest stage 
revolves around a morality ot individual principles of conscience. 
There is an internalized ideal which exercises pressure toward behavior 
that seems right regardless ot environmental reactions. What is right 
is following self-chosen ethical principles. Rules are usually valid 
because they are based upon such principles, but when they violate these 
principles the individual must follow the principles and not the laws. 
Motivation to obey these principles is based upon the rational belief in 
the validity of universal moral principles and a personal commitment to 
uphold them. Socially, the perspective is that ot a rational person who 
recognizes the nature of morality, i.e., the fact that people are ends, 
not means, and must be treated as such. 
Kohlberg (1969) suggested that it may be useful to view the three 
levels as comprising three d1fferent relationships between the self and 
society·s rules and expectations. From this perspective, rules and 
social expectations are external to the self for the preconventional 
person, rules and expectations are internalized during the conventional 
level, and the principled moral thinker has differentiated self from the 
rules of others and defines values in keeping with self-chosen 
principles. 
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In a more recent analysis, Kohlberg (1976) argued that social 
perspective, i.e., a viewpoint which is shared by participants in a 
relationship or a group, defines and unifies the characteristics of the 
conventional level ot morality because conventional level persons 
subordinate individual needs to the needs of the group or relationship. 
This is seen as being a qualitatively different social perspective from 
the egocentric viewpoint of preconventional morality. Another 
qualitative change takes place at the principled level, where the 
individual now believes that roles alone, i.e., the obligations and 
expectations of society, should not be the determining factor in moral 
decisions. While legal and social obligations are understood, moral 
obligations take precedence when moral and legal viewpoints differ. 
Kohlberg is unequ~vocal in his claim that each successive stage of 
moral development represents a more adequate way of reasoning about and 
solving ethical issues. While critics argue that stage definitions may 
be incomplete or erroneous (e.g., Sullivan & Quarter, 1972; Turiel, 
1975), Kohlberg asserted that the stages he has described are true from 
the standpoint of empirical observation and logical analysis. He argued 
that "anyone who interviewed children about moral dilemmas and who 
followed them longitudinally in time would come to our six stages and no 
others" (1976, p. 47). Thus, although any number of possible stages 
may be conceptualized, Kohlberg is convinced that only his six stages 
will manifest themselves in invariant sequence. 
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Research QA Kphlber2's Theory 
Research has tended to support Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental 
view of moral development. In his major review, Hoffman (1970) cited 
scores ot studies which conclude that there are developmental changes in 
moral reasoning. Keasy (1975) suggested that criteria for proposing 
moral stages have clearly been met and resolved. 
Of more interest for the present research is the central role 
Kohlberg has assigned to cognitive and soc1al development as necessary 
conditions for moral development. Curiously, this hypothesized 
relationship has not been subject to much empirical verification. A 
large body of research has reported substantial positive correlations 
between performance on standardized IQ tests and moral development (see 
Hoffman, 1970, for a summary) but such findings do not demonstrate that 
cognitive development is necessary for moral development. Moreover, it 
has been argued that mental operations are, at best, being assessed only 
indirectly by IQ tests (Keasey, 1975). Where IQ tests seem to be 
assessing quantitative differences in cognition, Piaget and Kohlberg 
stress that cognitive development is marked by qualitative changes. It 
is thus debataole whether IQ tests tap the qualitative changes in 
reasoning which Kohlberg has specified as being necessary for moral 
development. 
Fortunately, a few studies which assess cognitive stage and moral 
stage do exist. Lee (1971) tested children ages 5 to 17 on six 
Piagetian cognitive measures and her own five-stage system of moral 
development. She reported significant correlations between Piagetian 
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measures and moral development, averaging .33 with age partialled out. 
Lee concluded that cognitive and moral development occur in parallel 
manner. She refrained from assuming any necessary relationship because 
chronological age was a major variable in her study and any number of 
variables associated with age may have contributed to the correlations. 
Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey (1974) attempted to avoid age contounds 
by investigating cognitive and moral functioning within two female age 
groups. Preadolescents (age 12) were chosen because Piaget would 
suggest that formal operations may be 
established by that age. College students 
have reached the achievement phase of 
emerging but would not be 
(age 19) presumably could 
formal thought. The authors 
sought not only to establish whether there was a relationship between 
formal operations and principled morality but also to determine whether 
formal thought 
proposed. Each 
is necessary for principled morality, as Kohlberg 
participant received six Kohlberg dilemmas and three 
Piagetian tasks ot formal reasoning. 
Correlations between domains were .60 for the younger group and .58 
for the older. Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey suggested that these results 
clearly indicate a strong relationship between cognitive and moral 
development which is independent of chronological age. Further, all 
principled moral reasoners showed evidence of formal operations. None 
of the younger participants showed principled morality but over half 
showed some formal ability. The authors concluded that their findings 
support two of Kohlberg's notions: (a) that formal operations are 
necessary but not sufficient for principled morality, and (b) that there 
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should be a lag between attainment of a cognitive stage and its 
corresponding moral level. This lag is anticipated because, from a 
Piagetian perspective, cognitive structures must consolidate before 
being applied to moral reasoning. 
changes are reflected first in 
Piaget has suggested that 
logical reasoning, then 
perspective, and finally in moral reasoning. 
structural 
in SOC1al 
Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan (1977) assessed cognitive and 
moral levels ot 340 individuals who ranged in age from 10 to 50. They 
found that only about 30% of the adults showed signs of having reached 
the achievement phase of formal operations. Most adults were in the 
preparation phase, and 15% displayed only concrete operations. Analyses 
ot cognitive and moral stages were viewed as supporting Kohlberg's 
assertions that formal thought is necessary for principled morality: 
Only fully formal thinkers showed principled moral reasoning. Yet 
formal thought is not sufficient because Kuhn et al. found many formal 
thinkers who were assessed as engaging in conventional moral reasoning. 
If consolidated formal thought is necessary for principled 
morality, then individuals who have achieved that level should be more 
easily stimulated toward higher moral functioning than those who are 
still in the early or transitional phase. This was the hypothesis of 
Walker and Richards (1979), who exposed achievement-formal and 
preparation-formal thinkers, all of whom showed stage 3 morality, to 
stage 5 moral reasoning. They found the achievement-formal group later 
showed evidence of higher moral reasoning while the trans1tional group 
did not. Walker and Richards suggested that the early formal thinkers 
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were constrained in their moral development by their cognitive stage. 
Given the cognitive-developmental emphasis on social perspective 
development as being necessary for moral development, it is also curious 
that few studies have attempted to investigate the relationship. Piaget 
and Kohlberg both suggest that moral d~velopment may be precipitated by 
cognitive disequ1librium which arises out of interactions with peers. 
Kohlberg proposed that if moral development is conceptualized as being a 
process of restructuring modes of role taking, then the basic social 
inputs are role-taking opportunities. And at least some of these 
opportunities should be a function of the amount of soc1al interaction a 
child experiences plus the quality of participation. The quality should 
vary depending upon how close a child comes to the power structure of 
social groups. Kohlberg argued that the extent of social involvement 
and the social responsibilities assumed are associated with accelerated 
moral development. For example, Kohlberg reported that popular children 
tend to progress morally at faster rates than unpopular children. 
Keasey (1971) 
relationship to moral 
fifth and sixth grades. 
investigated social participation and its 
development. Subjects were boys and girls from 
Each child received five Kohlberg dilemmas. 
Later, Keasey sought data on social participation by having the children 
fill out rating sheets on themselves and their peers regarding such 
factors as who was most popular, who was the best leader, and what clubs 
the chilaren belonged to. All told, Keasey collected data on eight 
social measures in each classroom. High and low criterion groups were 
then formed for the children who received the highest and lowest 
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rankings. Mean moral stage ratings for each group were then compared. 
I 
In no case did mean moral stage of a low social criterion group equal or 
exceed any high criterion group. 
Keasey viewed his results as supporting the hypothesis that greater 
degrees of social participation should lead to more role-taking 
opportunities which should enhance moral development. He concluded that 
popularity was related to moral development. On the other hand, it is 
possible that children with higher moral values tend to be more popular. 
Flavell (1968) concurred with Kohlberg's pos1tion that role taking 
involves an ability to understand an interaction between self and 
another through the other's eyes. Development of the ability implies 
increasing accuracy in assessing attitudes and expectations of others, 
predicting behaviors of others in particular situations, and projecting 
how one's own actions affect attitudes of others toward oneself. 
Kohlberg is explicit in proposing that higher levels of morality are 
made possible by increasingly accurate role-taking abilities. 
Flavell suggested that reorganization in role-taking skills takes 
place between the ages of 8 and 10. The shift he reported is from an 
egocentric view toward a more mature social perspective. And Kohlberg 
proposed that movement begins to be possible in those years from 
preconventional to conventional morality. Accordingly, Selman (1971) 
undertook two experiments to test the hypothesis that a middle chilahood 
role-taking shift is necessary for moral development. 
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Selman's first study .employed 20 children at each age 8, 9, and 10. 
Each child received two Flavell role-taking tests, Kohlberg dilemmas, 
and the Peabody P1cture Vocabulary Test (to control for general 
intelligence). Selman did not suggest causality on the basis ot this 
first study but did find that higher role-taking scores were 
significantly correlated with higher moral judgments and that higher 
mental age on the Peabody meant chronologically earlier advances in 
role-taking skills. 
Selman's (1~71) second experiment essentially replicated the first 
to see if social and moral development were simultaneous or if one 
preceded and perhaps could be viewed as being necessary for emergence of 
the other. Subjects were those children from the previous study, 
performed one year earlier, who had scored at low levels on role taking 
and moral measures. Results were that some children had advanced on 
both measures, more had advanced solely on the soc1al domain, and none 
had advanced only morally. Selman concluded that these data support 
Kohlberg's notion that social development is necessary for moral 
development. 
Ambron and Irwin (1975), working with 5- and 7-year-olds, presented 
role taking and moral judgment tasks (not specified) and found that the 
higher the role-taking skills the higher the moral reasoning abilities 
of even children this young. 
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These studies lend support to Kohlberg's theoretical assumptions. 
There is support for the proposed cognitive-moral relationship (Kuhn et 
al., 1977; Lee, 1971; Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974; Walker & 
Richards, 1979) and for the soc1al-moral relationship (Ambron & Irwin, 
1975; Keasey, 1971; Selman, 1971). An alternative method of testing 
Kohlberg's assumptions about the interdependence of the three domains 
could come from experimental interventions into cognitive or social 
development, e.g., by constraining peer interactions to see the effects 
on moral development. Such manipulations are clearly unethical. There 
are, however, instances where development of one or both of the 
supposealy necessary domains has been nonexperimentally precluded or 
delayed. In such cases Kohlberg's theory would predict delays in moral 
development. 
Perry and Krebs (1980) examined social and moral development of 
mentally retarded cnildren and teenagers to determine whether social and 
moral stages were consistent with their subjects' chronological or 
mental ages. Mental ability was established by quantitative rather than 
Piagetian measures. Results were that social and moral levels were 
consistent with mental ages as measured by standardized IQ tests. The 
authors concluded that their findings support Kohlberg's theory. 
The Perry and Krebs study i.s important in the present context 
because it is the first study to assess all three developmental domains 
in a single study, even though Piagetian cognitive functioning was not 
tested. However, Perry and Krebs investigated individuals whose 
cognitive functioning was arrested. A better test of Kohlberg's theory 
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might be an investigation of individuals who were delayed in their 
cognitive and social development to see the effects on moral 
development. Such a sample exists, comprised of persons who are deaf. 
neaf lndjyiduals 
In the United States alone, as many as 40 million individuals may 
suffer from some degree of hearing loss (Sataloff, Sataloff, & Vasallo, 
1980). Stewart (1978) reported that approximately 13 million American 
adults and cnilaren have clinically diagnosed hearing impairment, some 6 
million ot these have s1gnificant binaural loss of hearing, and roughly 
2 million are profoundly deaf. There is a consideraole body ot research 
dealing with intellectual functioning of deaf people (e.g., Furth, 1966; 
Myklebust, 1964; Savage, Evans, & Savage, 1981) and a substantial 
literature which presents consensual subjective evaluations of deaf 
socialization (e.g., Meadow, 1976) and deaf morality (e.g., Nass, 1964), 
but there have been no attempts to investigate the relationship between 
cognitive, social, and moral development in deaf persons. A study which 
assesses functioning of the three domains in deaf persons could not only 
add to our understanding of the psychology ot deafness but could also 
serve as an evaluation of the assumptions Kohlberg maked regarding 
necessary conditions for moral development. 
Development of deaf persons will now be considered. Following 
current convention, and to avoid consideration of complex audiological 
data, the d1scussion will follow Fraser's (1970) pragmatic consideration 
of deafness as being hearing loss which is sufficiently severe as to 
preclude spontaneous and unaided understanding of oral communication. 
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The discussion will also focus on individuals who were born deaf 
(congenital deafness) or who lost their hearing prior to the advent of 
spoken language (prelingual adventitious deafness). Liben (1978) 
reported that about 95% of all deaf individuals fall into these 
categories. 
Oyeryiew 
Over 90% ot prelingually deaf children in the United States have 
hearing parents. Since most parents have no cause to expect that their 
children may be deaf and because of the similarity of first-year 
vocalizations among deaf and hearing children (Fry, 1966), realization 
that there is a hearing problem may come slowly. Typically, deafness 
may not be diagnosed until well into the second or third year of life. 
The diagnosis of deafness may create a trauma for the family. Many 
critical decisions must be made regarding special communication training 
and types ot education. Advice from professionals who work with deaf 
people is often contradictory, particularly with regard to what types of 
communication should be taught, viz., should the child learn 
simultaneous communication, i.e., signs and speech, or be restricted to 
attempts to speechread and verbalize language (oralism). This 
controversy has a long history among those who argue in favor of ora1ism 
to the exclusion of sign language and those who argue that simultaneous 
communication permits early and effective communication which may direct 
training in speechreading and oral speech. Proponents of the latter 
position encourage getting messages across in any way possible, 
including use of signs, fingerspelling, oral language, mime, and 
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gesture. 
Until the last decade, the oralists have dominated, arguing that 
children who are allowed to use sign language will not be motivated to 
learn oral language. Though not supported by research, these arguments 
were so powerful that as recently as the mid-1960's only about 11% of 
hearing parents employed any sign language to communicate with their 
deaf children (Stuckless & Birch, 1966). Yet it has been estimated that 
the skilled oral deaf child may have a useful vocabulary of roughly 200 
words by age 5, compared with the userul vocabulary of a hearing child 
at that age of 2,000 to 4,000 words (Liben, 1978). 
Until recently, then, the deaf American preschooler lived in an 
environment where there was little opportunity to communicate and 
transmit knowledge. Learning was possible but much learning must have 
been acquired 
and prohibited 
first-hand. Similarly, an understanding of permissible 
behaviors, i.e., the family's moral standards, was 
acqu1red through trial and error. Some behaviors were punished, others 
were not. And for deaf children of hearing parents, punishment is most 
typ1cally physical (Mindel & Vernon, 1971). Schlesinger and Meadow 
(1972) surveyed hearing parents and found that 71% of mothers of deaf 
children used spanking as the primary method of punishment while only 
25% of mothers ot hearing children did so. M1ndel and Vernon (1971) 
suggest that to compensate for the frequent spankings, parents of deaf 
children may sometimes allow behaviors which they do not tolerate in 
their hearing children. Such ambiguity may lead to confusion as to what 
the moral standards of the family are. Typ1cally, ilie mother 
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demonstrates, and then punishes, because she has no means to communicate 
the whys involved in moral behavior (Harris, 1978). 
Typ1cally, deaf children of hearing parents have little or no 
contact with other deaf individuals, child or adult, and they have few 
or no role models. These children may think that they are the only 
person in the world who cannot hear, or that they may eventually outgrow 
their handicap (Liben, 1978). As a result of limited contact with 
others, the deaf child has a severely restricted choice of people from 
whom to learn. "What the mother regards as acceptable and unacceptable 
will be more firmly implanted as a permanent part of the deaf chilo's 
personality pattern" (Mindel & Vernon, 1971, p. 9). 
The outgrowth of maternal sanctions may be safe behaviors which 
avoid punishment but which also limit activities and instances of 
testing. Furth (1966) observed that deaf children often seem rigid in 
their behavior as if unable, or very slow, to shift from one principle 
or viewpoint to another. He argued that this lack of flexibility is 
understandable inasmuch as deaf people learn qu1te early to repeat what 
they have learned, perhaps due to social training to remain in positions 
they have found secure to avoid punishment. The result, Furth 
continued, is a lack of initiative in thinking, with little sense of 
discovery and an unwillingness or inability to look for reasons why, 
rather than deficiencies in reasoning ability itself. Furth concluded 
that it rarely occurs to deaf persons to question what appears to them 
to be reality. 
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In view of these descriptions of deaf children, it is not 
surprising to find similar characterizations of deaf adults. 
Schlesinger and Meadow (1972) described deaf adults as being cognitively 
more rigid and socially less mature than hearing adults. Schlesinger 
(1978) noted that the most frequent generalization about deaf adults is 
that they seem to reflect a high degree of emotional immaturity. They 
seem to lack understanding of and regard for the feelings of others, 
along with a limited awareness ot the impact of their own behavior and 
its consequences in relation to others, i.e., an egocentric view of the 
world (Ranier & Altshuler, 1966). Deaf adults are also described as 
tending to behave impulsively, making gross coercive demands to have 
their needs satisfied, with almost a complete absence of internal 
controls over their behavior (Altshuler, 1964). Yet deaf adults tend to 
judge behaviors in terms of rigid rulebooks of etiquette which have no 
provisions for extenuating circumstances (Schlesinger & Meadow, 1972). 
Despite the long domination by oralists, an overwhelming majority 
of deaf Americans learn and employ sign language to communicate with 
each other (Bellugi & Klima, 1978). One of the major reasons for the 
prevalence ot sign language is that it is practically impossible for 
deaf individuals to speechread each other with any degree of accuracy. 
English vowels are indistinguishable when speechread because they are 
made by changes within the mouth rather than on the lips. Only about 
40% of English phonemes are detectable by lip movement (Liben, 1978). 
Thus, to communicate with each other, deaf people employ sign language, 
a visual language where meaning is conveyed by (a) shape of the hands, 
(b) movement ot the hands, (c) position of the hands in relation to the 
34 
body, and (d) hand orientation. 
The s1gn language deaf Americans employ with each other is not 
typically a signed version of English, but rather is American Sign 
Language (ASL, or Ameslan). There is a s1gned version of English, but 
it is employed primarily in educational settings. ASL is not a 
derivative or degenerate form ot written or spoken English (Bellugi & 
Khma, 1978). Ameslan may have originated as a loose collection of 
pantomimes and gestures, but it has evolved into a language in its own 
right, with the synta~ and hierarchical organization which are typical 
of human languages. 
Bellugi and Klima 0978) suggested that ASL has three 
distinguishing characteristics. First, it has a lexicon which does not 
correspond to that of English, and the grammatical principles which 
govern the modification of signs are different, in form and content, 
from grammatical processes of English and other spoken languages. 
Second, Ameslan is not contined to concrete ideas. It is a full-grown 
language which contains possible expression of ideas at any level of 
abstraction, with a vocabulary to handle religion, politics, ethics, 
history, and other areas ot abstract thought or fantasy. And third, ASL 
is not a universal system of pantomime. While there may be some shared 
signs which other manual languages employ, for all but the most 
elementary purposes the various sign systems of the world are as 
mutually incomprehensible as, say, English and Chinese. 
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In the use ot signed versions of English, Furth (1966) suggested 
that deaf indiviauals may find it easier to learn the vocabulary of 
objects and events which are tangible, and to lack the means to express 
the nuances which are involved in abstract notions such as purpose, 
democracy, or justice. ASL has no such limits. 
Cognitive Fnnctjpnjng JJ..t. Ilea£. Pepple 
Pinter (e.g., Pinter & Reamer, 1920) was among the first to 
investigate intellectual functioning of deaf persons. He concluded that 
the general intellectual level of deaf children was below that of 
hearing children by an average of two years. Lane (1948) reviewed the 
literature from 1930 and observed that, although results were mixed 1 
there seemed to be an average delay in cognitive development in deaf 
individuals ot about a year. Myklebust (1964) reported delays of two to 
three years, and Savage, Evans, and Savage (1981) reported delays of at 
least one year. 
There is, thus, agreement that deaf people are delayed in their 
cognitive development as compared with hearing people, but estimates of 
the degree of delay vary, partially as a function of instruments used 
and populations sampled. There is consensus, however, regarding 
proposed causes for the delay. Myklebust (1964) argued that reasoning 
in deaf persons is delayed because of restricted experiences and 
opportunities for learning. Because deaf chilaren lack auditory 
information input, they presumably are restricted in acqu1ring verbal 
symbolism to aid their reasoning processes. Savage et al. (1981) 
suggested that deafness affects some psychological processes more than 
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others. For example, verbal and language skills seem to be retarded to 
the point where conceptual thinking is affected. 
There is, ot course, disagreement as to the degree to which verbal 
skills mediate thinking processes. Vernon (1967) argued that verbal 
language does not serve as a symbol system for thought. Piaget believes 
that symbolic functioning is a necessary prerequ1site for language use. 
For Piaget, symbols are idiosyncratic cognitive representations of 
objects and events. There are five modes of representation, listed in 
order of developmental complexity: (a) deferred imitation, (b) symbolic 
play, (c) grapnic representation, (d) mental imagery, and (e) language. 
Together, these five modes comprise the semiotic function. P1aget 
suggested that language is not necessary for symbolic development. 
Instead, language must be assimilated into a symbol system which has 
already begun to develop (Piaget & lnhelder, 1969). For Piaget, then, 
language is not the major organizing factor in cognitive development, 
although language may be necessary for formal operations (Cowan, 1978). 
Whorf (cited in Dale, 1976), Rosenstein (1960), and Kates, Yudin, and 
Tiffany (1962) agree that verbal skills are required for development of 
competence in abstract reasoning. 
Regardless of theoretical disagreement, delays in cognitive 
functioning of deaf individuals appear primarily on tasks which requ1re 
abstract reasoning (e.g., Heider & Heider, 1941; Oleron, 1953). 
Myklebust (1964) argued that "it is logical to conclude that at least to 
some degree this inferiority [in abstract reasoning skills] is a 
secondary, reciprocal condition to language limitation" (p. 89) rather 
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than being related to mental inferiority. 
It is also possible that the reported inferiority in abstract 
reasoning of deaf persons reflects not inferior reasoning skills but 
inadequate means of conveying the products of reasoning. Recall 
Piaget's contention that hearing children initially employ s1gns as if 
they were symbols and only after repeated social exposure outside the 
home come to understand the constraints of social agreement regarding 
significates of the signs. Deaf children and adults may reason in a 
manner which is identical to that of hearing persons but be unable to 
convey the products of their reasoning because others do not understand 
the id1osyncratic nature of their use of signs. And it may be that this 
communication problem is more of a factor in dealing with abstract 
matters than with tangible ones. 
Savage et al. (1981) reported that delays in abstract reasoning 
skills in deaf persons seem to increase with age and wonder if some 
ceiling effect might be coming into play. This view was not supported 
by Myklebust (1964), Furth (1966), nor results of over 50 independent 
studies which report that deaf and hearing adults have essentially the 
same distribution and mean of IQ scores (Mindel & Vernon, 1971). 
As we have seen, however, Kohlberg specified that moral development 
is tied to Piagetian cognitive development rather than to amount of 
knowledge. Furth has been a pioneer in investigating performance of 
deaf individuals on Piagetian measures. In an effort to reduce, if not 
eliminate, possible constraints on performance due to language 
deficiences, he has tried to adapt Piagetian tasks to make instructions 
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as language-free as possible. For example, Furth (1966) reported that 
there are differences between deaf and hearing children's 
conceptualization of the comparative "more." Where hearing children, on 
conservation tasks, seem to understand that "more" means which stimulus 
object containa more quantity, deaf children seem to regard the 
comparative as inqu1ring which stimulus ~ more to make the objects 
equal. Furth has frequently trained deaf subjects to criterion on some 
task and then switched to another, related task to see if the concept 
training would transLer. When such procedures are employed, performance 
typ1cally improves, although deaf people still lag behind hearing 
people. 
On weight conservation problems, Furth (1964a) finds about a 
two-year d1fference: Deaf 8 year olds give answers which are similar to 
those ot hearing 6-year-olds. On conservation of quantity, Furth (1966) 
reported deaf children achieve the concept about five years later than 
hearing children do. But Furth is convinced that these are lags, not 
ceilings. In an investigation of non-college adults, ages 20 to 50, 
Furth (1964b) assessed classification skills by training participants to 
sort a variety ot objects according to their color, then switched to 
same-color objects ot various shapes to see if sorting would be made on 
the basis or shape. There was similar performance by deaf and hearing 
participants. Furth (1966) also reported similarity of results for deaf 
and hearing adults on tasks of symbol discovery and symbol transrer. 
Findings sucn as these suggest to Furth that deaf individuals can 
overcome developmental lags and have the same potential for abstract 
reasoning as do hearing persons. He believes that the rigidity which is 
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so frequently observed in deaf cognition does not reflect an inability 
to reason but a lack of motivation to employ sophisticated reasoning. 
Piaget presented a related argument by suggesting that individuals 
who achieve formal operations are in no way constrained to always employ 
formal thought. Instead, formal operations will be engaged only when 
necessary for problem-solving. Getz (1953) reported that deaf 
environments, e.g., jobs, rarely requ1re abstract reasoning. The 
ability may be present, but it is seldom observed because it is not 
expected. Emerton, Layne, and Braverman (1977) reported that an 
extremely high proportion of deaf workers have occupations which place 
few demands on their cognitive capabilities. 
Socialization Qf Deaf Persons 
Socially, too, deaf people appear to be less mature than hearing 
peers (Meadow, 1976; Schuldt & Schuldt, 1972). McHugh (1975) reported 
that deaf adults are often fired from jobs for social reasons rather 
than for job performance. Emerton (1976) characterized deaf persons as 
having emotional instability, egocentricity, impulsiveness, and a lack 
of tact. Lack of social skills is so pervasive that the National 
Technical Institute for the Deaf has identified the need for enhanced 
social skills in deaf persons as basic to its mission (Emerton & Bishop, 
1977). 
As in the case ot cognitive functioning, deficits in social 
development of deaf individuals may be related to language deficiencies 
as well as to restricted opportunities for social interaction in 
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preschool years. Schlesinger and Meadow (1972) suggested that language 
may be central in the development of the concept of self. Mead (1934) 
has argued that persons are human only insofar as they can see 
themselves as others see them and can thus act in accordance with 
expectations of what reactions of others might be. To describe this 
ability, Mead coined the term, "role taking." Schlesinger and Meadow 
suggested that individuals can become objects to themselves by means of 
the manipulation ot symbols, i.e., through language. The self makes 
symbolic indications based upon experience and employs the symbols to 
forecast the future. In this view, a person who is deficient in 
language might have problems in representing expectations symbolically, 
to the detriment of how realistic such predictions might be. 
Research on socialization and role taking in deaf persons is not 
extensive. Bradway (1937) was apparently the first to present the 
Vineland Social Maturity Scale to deaf children. She found that her 
deaf participants were "20 percent inferior" to hearing individuals on 
social competence at all ages investigated. More recent studies (e.g., 
Bolton, Cull, & Hardy, 1974; Emerton, Mangione, Marqu1s, & Garrison, 
1978; Meadow, 1976) have supported the assertion that deaf people are 
developmentally delayed on measures of socialization. 
~ Reasonin~ in ~ Persons 
Similarly, deaf individuals appear to lag behind the hearing in the 
development of moral reasoning. Apparently, only three studies are 
available. Nass (1964) employed s1x deaf children at each age, 8 
through 12, to compare their judgments on moral issues with those of 
hearing children testeu in another 
Intelligence Scale for Children 
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study. Scores from the Wechsler 
were available for deaf and hearing 
subjects. IQ scores were rated as about average for the groups. Four 
stories involving moral dilemmas were presented to each child. Two of 
the stories were created to evaluate peer reciprocity versus dependence 
on adult authority. Two other stories, adapted from P1aget, were 
designed to assess ability to perceive intention of the actor versus 
magnitude of consequences. 
clinical method. 
Interviews were conducted using Piaget's 
Nass found that the hear1ng children were significantly superior in 
ability to take intentions into account but the deaf children were equal 
or superior to the hearing on stories dealing with peer reciprocity 
versus authority dependence. Nass viewed these findings as suggesting 
that deaf children lag behind hearing children in ability to perceive 
intentions of others but are equal or superior to hearing children in 
being concerned more with peer relations than with pleasing or being 
dependent upon authority. He speculated that peer concern may be due to 
the common experiences of deaf children which might tend to bind them 
together. 
Unfortunately, Nass (1964) was not clear as to how the stories were 
presented, i.e., whether they were written, spoken, or signed. Nor was 
he clear about how the interrogations were performed, although he did 
refer to problems with wording of the stories and said that the deaf 
children's responses were not "verbally complete". Because the research 
was conducted at the Lexington School for the Deaf in New York City, 
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which used the oral method in 1964 (E. Shroyer, personal communication, 
April, 1982), we may infer that signing was not used. 
DeCaro and Emerton (1978) presented Kohlberg's moral dilemmas over 
a three-year period to entering freshmen (n = 253) at the National 
Technical Institute for the Deaf. Porter and Taylor's (1972) 
standardized scoring protocol was employed to assess moral stages. 
Simultaneous communication was used throughout. Students watched as 
each d1lemma was s1gned and spoken and then read it in written English 
from test booklets. Results were that over 80% of these college 
freshmen scored at preconventional levels of moral reasoning. None 
showed principled morality. 
DeCaro and Emerton concluded their report with some observations of 
interest for the present research. First, scores as a whole were lower 
than expected. Second, participants seemed to generally rely on 
authority figures or social systems as if they held a low opinion of 
their own moral reasoning ability. The authors concluded that perhaps 
role-taking abilities in these students were not fully developed as 
compared with those ot hearing peers, perhaps as a result of restricted 
social interactions, limited experience in discussing feelings, and 
little communication about reasons and consequences of action. Since 
social measures were not taken in this study, such observations are 
speculations. 
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More recently, Peterson, Dow, and Savage (1979), in a preliminary 
study, investigated moral reasoning in 28 deaf children plus an equal 
number ot bearing children. Ages ranged from 7 to 13. A dilemma based 
upon Piaget's "cup" story was employed to assess ability to judge intent 
as opposed to magnitude ot consequences. Presentation was in the form 
of a 11s1lent movie" on videotape. Questioning was by simultaneous 
communication. Questions probed for (a) comprehension of the story, (b) 
judgment, i.e., who was naughtier, (c) justification for the judgwent, 
and (d) individual assessments ot the actors, e.g., "Was this cbila 
good?", to overcome possible limitations of the younger children in the 
comparative question. Because the paper presents pilot data, it does 
not list ages ot the cnildren in relation to their moral judgments and 
it refrains from reaching conclusions except that the deaf children 
lagged behind the hearing in moral reasoning. Twelve of the deaf 
children made moral judgments based upon magnitude of consequences, but 
only three bearing children did so. 
These three studies suggest that deaf individuals 
bearing persons in the development of moral reasoning. 
tested deaf children of average intelligence who lagged in 
lag behind 
Nass (1964) 
ability to 
infer motives, a finding which suggests that role-taking skills may also 
have been delayed. DeCaro and Emerton (1978) tested entering college 
freshmen and found moral levels were lower than expected. No cognitive 
measures were taken, but an inference that the subjects were of at least 
average intelligence seems warranted. Peterson, Dow, and Savage (1979) 
found less advanced moral development in deaf than in bearing children. 
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None of these studies assess relationships between cognitive 
functioning, social functioning, and moral judgment although they do 
make subjective observations. The present investigation seeks 
assessments in all three domains to test Kohlberg's assumptions as well 
as for adding to our understanding of the moral development of deaf 
individuals. 
Ratipnale 
Research linking Piagetian-cognitive, social, and moral development 
has typically been correlational. Such studies have consistently shown 
significant correlations between measures of cognitive-moral and 
social-moral domains. The study which looked at all three domains 
(Perry & Krebs, 1980) employed standardized IQ tests, rather than 
Piagetian tasks, to assess cognitive functioning. 
Research on· Kohlberg's theory has shown that there are 
relationships among the three domains, that level of progress in one 
domain is followed regularly by progress in another, and that moral 
development is not greater than cognitive and social development should 
allow. Correlations, of course, do not necessarily imply causation. An 
experimental attempt to enhance moral development beyond the necessary 
cognitive stage (Walker & Richards, 1979) reported that moral 
development was not stimulated to exceed the proposed necessary 
cognitive condition, as Kohlberg would expect. 
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Another test of Kohlberg's tbeo~y would come from interventions in 
which development in one domain were constrained and progress in other 
domains was observed, but such manipulations are unethical. G1ven that 
experimentally induced constraints on development are not possible, an 
alternative might be to study moral functioning of deaf populations in 
which cognitive and social development have been delayed naturally. 
Numerous studies suggest that deaf individuals lag behind bearing peers 
by several years in reaching Piagetian cognitive milestones but have the 
potential for achieving formal operations. There is also evidence that 
restricted social contacts in preschool years, perhaps accompanied by 
deficiencies in language skills, have limited social development and 
role-taking opportunities. If Kohlberg's theory is correct, therefore, 
moral development of deaf individuals will be constrained by their 
cognitive and social development. 
According 
developmental 
to Piaget, Kohlberg, 
research, typical hearing 
and contemporary cognitive 
10-year-olds should be late 
concrete operational. They should also be transitional in acquiring 
social perspective and may be entering the stage of conventional moral 
judgment. Typ1cal hearing 15-year-olds should be transitional formal 
operational, with full social perspective and conventional moral 
reasoning. And bearing adults have the potential for consolidated 
formal operations, prior-to-society perspective, and principled 
morality. 
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In the deaf population, however, 10-year-olds might be early 
concrete .operational (or even late preoperational), with egocentric 
social perspective and preconventional moral reasoning, and 15-year-olds 
might be consolidated concrete operational, with the potential for 
emerging soc1al perspective and conventional moral reasoning. Deaf 
adults should have the potential for full formal operations, the highest 
social perspective, and principled moral reasoning. 
The present research investigated several implications of 
Kohlberg's theory by examining all three developmental domains. The 
research also provided normative data on moral development of deaf 
people. Recall that only one study has been found which investigates 
Kohlberg's moral stages in deaf populations, and it dealt with adults. 
The first hypothesis that was tested follows from reports that deaf 
individuals' cognitive development lags behind that of hearing people by 
as much as three years. If the deaf participants in the present 
research were typ1cal, they should be less cognitively developed than 
hearing individuals of comparable ages. 
The second hypothesis tested derives from Kohlberg's assertion that 
cognitive development is necessary for the development of social 
role-taking skills. Specifically, consolidated concrete thinking is 
said to be necessary for development of soc1al perspective taking. 
Therefore, it was expected that role-taking skills ot those who had 
reached the stage of conso~idated concrete operations would be greater 
than the scores ot those who had not reached that cognitive stage. 
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The third hypothesis testea stems from Kohlberg's belief that the 
same moral reasoning processes are used to reason about all moral 
dilemmas, regardless of how familiar participants are with the events 
the dilemmas describe. For example, Kohlberg reports no differences in 
moral levels of hearing American children as assessed by the Camp story 
and a dilemma involving adults in Europe, one of whom is dying from a 
rare form ot cancer. It seems reasonable to assume that American 
children should be able to identify more closely with a boy who has a 
paper route and who wants to go to summer camp than with an adult who 
steals a drug in an attempt to save his wife's life. Similarly, it 
seems likely that deaf individuals might identify more with other deaf 
persons than with hearing people, although Kohlberg would predict that 
there would still be no differences in moral reasoning. 
The fourth hypothesis tested is based upon Kohlberg's assumption 
that moral reasoning requ1res logical reasoning. Kohlberg has argued 
that formal operations are necessary for principled moral reasoning and 
that consolidated concrete operations are necessary for conventional 
moral reasoni~~· Therefore, it was expected that higher stages of moral 
reasoning could follow higher stages of cognitive functioning. 
The final hypothesis tested is a logical derivative ot the above: 
If a given stage of cognitive development is necessary for a given level 
of moral reasoning, then a moral stage could not exceed its supposedly 
necessary cognitive stage. This means that individuals who have not 
reached consolidated concrete operations should not show Level II 
morality and that those who are not formal operational should not show 
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Level III morality. Recall that Kohlberg has reported that "essentially 
none . . • are at a higher moral stage than their logical stage" (1976, 
P• 32) • 
In summary, the following hypotheses were tested: (a) there should 
be delays in cognitive development of deaf participants as compared with 
the hearing population; (bJ role-taking skills should increase as a 
function ot cognitive development; (c) there should be no differences in 
deaf individuals' moral reasoning about situations involving either deaf 
or hearing people; (d) moral development should increase as a function 
of increases in cognitive development; and (e) moral reasoning should 
not exceed the cognitive stages which are presumed to be necessary 
conditions for moral development. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Methgd 
Sybjects 
Participants were 30 prelingually deaf individuals, 10 in each age 
group of 10-year-olds, 15-year-olds, and adults (ages 19 to 50). The 
two younger groups were students at the Central North Carolina School 
for the Deaf in Greensboro or the North Carolina School for the Deaf in 
Morganton. The adults live in Piedmont North Carolina and all attended 
special programs for deaf persons. The fact that all participants had 
attended or were attending special schools for deaf persons was taken as 
sufficient evidence ot the severity of their hearing loss. Because the 
populations from which these samples were taken are relatively limited, 
it was not possible to select equal numbers of wales and females at the 
age levels. Overall, 16 participants were female and 14 were male. 
Procedure 
Testing was performed in small groups in private rooms at the North 
Carolina Schools for the Deaf in Greensboro and Morganton, St. Paul's 
Episcopal Church in Winston-Salem, and Queens College in Charlotte. 
Group size was three or four for the students; one adult group numbered 
seven. Large conterence tables were available in three locations; 
Morganton provided desk chairs. In all four locations it was possible 
50 
to spread out so that all participants had a clear view of the 
television monitor on which the videotape was run. Each room also had a 
rheostat so that lighting could be reduced to make the television 
picture sharp and clear yet still allow sufficient light for reading the 
test booklets. There were no outside interruptions during testing 
sessions. 
Participants were escorted to the testing rooms where the male 
experimenter welcomed them. The opening remarks were an expression of 
thanks for participating and a reminder that if at any time someone had 
a question or wished to discontinue the testing please to signal so by 
raising a hand. No hands were raised. All remarks by the experimenter 
were interpreted by a certified interpreter for the deaf (Judy Apple, 
National Certification, in Greensboro; Linda Couch, North Carolina Level 
II Certification, in other locations). 
Participants received Piagetian cognitive tasks, social role-taking 
measures, and moral dilemmas. Presentation involved simultaneous 
communication on videotape by Dr. Edgar Shroyer. Written English 
vers1ons were available in the test booklets. A range of possible 
answers to each problem was provided in the booklets in an attempt to 
minimize restraints on performance due to expressive language 
deficiencies. The videotape was stopped after each problem and was not 
restarted until all participants had reported answering that. problem. 
-.l 
Materials 
Appendix). The first 
conservation of weight. 
achieved before weight 
two tasks 
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Five tasks were employed (see 
involve conservation of mass and 
In hearing populations, mass conservation is 
conservation. The mass problem is achieved by 
early concrete operations, the weight by consolidated concrete 
operations (Ginsburg & Opper, 1969). The remaining cognitive exercises 
were two verbal seriations and one proposition. Such tasks requ1re 
formal thinking because they involve reasoning in the abstract (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1969). These tasks are typ1cal of those employed in similar 
research (e.g. 1 Krebs & Gilmore, 1982; Walker, 1980; 1982). 
The Piagetian tasks were designed to assess stages of cognitive 
development. Participants were drawn from three age groups as a 
convenient way ot sampling potentially different stages of cognitive 
development, which is age-related but not age-dependent. 
Sgcjal measures. No instrument bas been designed specifically to 
assess Koblberg's social stages. Kohlberg designates social stage on 
the basis ot answers to those same moral dilemmas which he uses to 
assess moral stage. With no independent instrument, there can be little 
discrepancy between social and moral stages. 
There appear to be three aspects of social role taking and there 
are tasks to assess development of each (Kurdek 1 1978). Perceptual 
perspective tasks 1 such as Piaget's three mountain problem, assess 
ability to view things from another s physical perspective. Cognitive 
tasks are designed to measure ability to 
intentions, or motives. Affective tasks 
infer another's 
assess ability 
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thoughts, 
to judge 
someone's emotions based upon facial expression. The affective tasks 
are less language dependent 
cognitive tasks (Kurdek, 1978). 
and are more objectively scored than are 
An affective task was selected for the 
present research because it was theoretically appropriate, it was less 
language dependent, and it seemed to have ~ ~ validity because 
it deals with people in social situations. 
A typ1cal affective role-taking task involves pictures of events 
whicn characteristically evoke particular emotions, e.g., a scene of a 
birthday party. In each scene is one clearly delineated character whose 
facial expression is either congruent or incongruent with the depicted 
situation. The task is to identify the emotion shown. Three typical 
emotions which are eas1ly portrayed and which seem to have a universal 
meaning regardless or culture are happiness, sadness, and anger (Ekman, 
1971). When such tasks are employed, Shantz (1975) reported a 
developmental shift from reliance on situational cues, e.g., the 
birthday party, to facial cues, e.g., the sadness of the designated 
character. Snantz suggests that only in middle or late childhood do 
children begin to disregard situational cues in making affective 
judgments. 
For the present research, six cartoon-type pictures were created 
(see Appendix). The instrument can not test Kohlberg's highest stage of 
social development, viz., the prior-to-society perspective, but no 
independent instrument does. The affective task should, however, 
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measure social perspective development. In theory, more cognitively 
developed people should be less captured by situations and become 
increasingly able to detect emotional states based on facial 
expressions. Thus, there should be a correlation between cognitive 
level and affective task scores. 
~measures. Four moral dilemmas were presented (see Appendix). 
TWo are standard Kohlberg dilemmas and two are modified versions which 
preserve the essential ingredients of the standard versions but portray 
leading characters as being deaf. There is evidence that hearing 
persons can never be fully accepted into the deaf community (Jacobs, 
1980) and that there is a cohesiveness among deaf individuals which 
fosters mutual support and consideration (Nasa, 1964). The modified 
dilemmas manipulation was included to test whether reasoning on those 
dilemmas might differ from that shown on the standard versions. Order 
of presentation ot ~e standard and modified versions was 
counterbalanced. 
Results 
Scorin~ 
Pia~etian ~. From results ot the five Piagetian tasks, three 
cognitive stages were identified. Participants who failed both 
conservation problems were assigned to Cognitive Level I, comprised of 
those who have not reached the level of consolidated concrete 
operations. Participants who passed both conservation problems but 
fewer than two propositional problems were assigned to Cognitive Level 
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II, consolidated concrete operations. Those who passed both 
conservation problems and at least two ot the three propositional 
problems were assigned to Cognitive Level III, the stage of formal 
operations. Such criteria are typical of similar research (e.g., Krebs 
& Gilmore, 1982; Walker, 1980; 1982; Walker & Richards, 1979). 
Socjal measure. 
point. Scores could 
correct). 
For scoring, each correct answer was worth one 
thus range between 0 (none correct) and 6 (all 
~dilemmas. Scoring was done using Porter and Taylor's (1972) 
standardized scoring protocol. The protocol lists possible answers to 
the dilemmas with answers being typ1cal of the reasoning which 
characterizes Kohlberg's moral stages. The protocol eliminates the need 
for interviews and thus minimizes possible constraints on performance 
due to language deficiencies. 
Three questions were asked about each dilemma. Assigning moral 
reasoning to a stage was done by majority score or middle score of the 
three answers. For example, a participant whose three answers to a 
dilemma were rated as exemplifying characteristics of stages 2, 2, and 
2(3) (i.e., predominately stage 2 with overtones of stage 3) would be 
scored as reflecting stage 2 reasoning (majority score) on that dilemma. 
Answers 1(2), 2, and 2l3) would also be rated as stage 2 for that 
dilemma (middle score). 
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Based upon the d1lemma stages, Kohlberg assigns moral maturity 
scores by weighting each stage by its number (e.g., stage 2 has a weight 
of 2) and multiplying each stage weight by the percentage of scores at 
that stage (Porter & Taylor, 1972). To obtain percentages, each dilemma 
is assumed to be worth 3 points. A pure score receives all 3 points; a 
mixed score receives 2 points for the major stage and 1 point for the 
minor stage. Thus, with four dilemmas there are 12 points. To 
illustrate, assume that a person showed reasoning on the four dilemmas 
which was scored as reflecting stage 1 morality on the first dilemma, 
stage 2 on the second, stage 2 on the third, and stage 2(3) on the 
fourth. The percentages would be 3/12 stage 1 (all 3 points coming from 
the first dilemma) = 25%, 8/12 stage 2 (3 of those 8 points coming from 
the second dilemma, 3 from the third, and 2 from the fourth) = 67%, and 
1/12 stage 3 (coming from the fourth dilemma) = 8%. The moral maturity 
score would be calculated as follows: 100(.25 X 1 + o67 X 2 + .08 X 3) 
= 25 + 134 + 24 = 183. 
Moral maturity scores may range from 100 (pure stage 1) to 600 
(pure stage 6). 
Scoring results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Analyses 
Data from the social and moral procedures were used to assign 
individual's ranks on the dependent measures. Because ranks data are 
ordinal, nonparametric statistics were used to make comparisons. 
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Table 1 
Results of Piagetian Cognitive Tasks (Deaf Participants) 
Subject Mass Wgt. Ser I Ser II Prop Cog. Level 
10-1M No No No Yes No I 
10-2F Yes No Yes Yes No I 
10-3M No No No Yes No I 
10-4F No Yes Yes Yes No I 
10-5F No Yes Yes Yes No I 
10-6M No Yes No Yes No I 
10-7M No Yes No Yes No I 
10-BM No Yes No Yes No I 
10-91-1 No Yes No Yes No I 
10-10M No Yes Yes Yes No I 
15-1F No Yes No No No I 
15-2F No Yes No Yes No I 
15-3M No Yes No Yes No I 
15-4F No Yes No Yes No I 
15-5F Yes No No Yes No I 
15-6F No Yes No Yes No I 
15-7M Yes No No No No I 
15-BF Yes Yes No No No II 
15-9F Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
15-10F Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Results of Piagetian Cognitive Tasks (Deaf Participants) 
A-lF No No Yes Yes No I 
A-2F Yes Yes No No No II 
A-3F Yes Yes No Yes No II 
A-4F Yes Yes No Yes Yes III 
A-SM Yes Yes No Yes Yes III 
A-6M Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
A-7M Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
A-SM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
A-9M Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
A-lOF Yes Yes No Yes Yes III 
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TaDle 2 
Results ot Social and Moral Tasks (Deaf Participants) 
Social Tasks Deaf Dilem. Stnd. Dilem. Moral 
Subject Cong. Incong. Caro. Pris. Heinz Bros. Maturity 
10-1M 3 3 2 1 2 3 200 
10-2F 3 3 2 2 3 3 250 
10-3M 1 1 3 5 1 2 275 
10-4F 3 2 1 1(2) 2 2 158 
10-5F 3 3 4 3 1 2(3) 258 
10-6M 3 3 2 4 1 2(3) 233 
10-7M 3 3 3 2 3 2 250 
10-8M 3 2 4 2 4 2 300 
10-9M 3 2 2 4 3 2(3) 283 
10-10M 3 3 3 2 4 3(4) 308 
15-1F 3 2 2 3 5 2 300 
15-2F 3 0 3 1 6 3(4) 333 
15-3M 3 1 5 4(3) 4(6) 3(4) 366 
15-4F 3 2 5(6) 2(3) 1(2) 4 324 
15-SF 3 2 3 4 4 3(4) 358 
15-6F 3 3 2(3) 2 1(2) 1 166 
15-7M 2 2 2~3) 2 4(6) 1(2) 257 
15-8F 3 3 2 2(3) 4 2 258 
15-9F 3 3 3 1 4 2 250 
15-10F 3 3 3 1 6 2 300 
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Taole 2 (continued) 
Results ot Social and Moral Tasks (Deaf Participants) 
A-IF 3 3 5 3 3 2 325 
A-2F 3 3 4 3 6 2 375 
A-3F 3 3 2 4(3) 4 3(4) 325 
A-4F 3 3 4 4 4 3 375 
A-SM 3 2 2(3) 4(3) 4(6) 4 365 
A-6M 3 3 3 4(6) 4 2 341 
A-1M 3 2 4 4(3) 5 2(3) 378 
A-8M 3 3 5 3 4 1(2) 333 
A-9M 3 2 3 4 4(6) 2 341 
A-I OF 2 0 2 4(3) 4 4 342 
60 
It was expected that there would be delays in cognitive development 
of deaf participants. In hearing individuals, the stage of consolidated 
concrete operations is typ1cally achieved by age 10 (Ginsburg & Opper, 
1969). Thus, for the three age groups 10, 15, and adult, we would 
expect all hearing individuals to be at least Cognitive Level II. The 
observed frequencies for the deaf participants were none at age 10, 3 at 
age 15, and 9 at the adult level, which the chi square test showed is 
significantly fewer than would be expected from hearing persons, (2) = 
15, ~ < .001. 
Kohlberg's theory predicts increases in role-taking scores as a 
func~ion ot cognitive development. However, contrary to expectations, 
the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks showed that 
social perspective scores did not vary with cognitive development, H(2) 
= 3.7, ~ > .10. However, only 25 of the 180 items were answered 
incorrectly; 21 of these were on incongruous pictures and 11 were on the 
same p1cture, the boy being bitten by the dog. 
As expected, there were no differences in moral reasoning revealed 
by type of dilemma. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
comparing individual's moral maturity scores on the modified and 
standard dilemmas yielded & = -.342, ~ = .73 for a two-tailed test. The 
median moral maturity scores were 298 for the modified dilemmas and 300 
for the standard dilemmas. 
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Kohlberg's theory predicts that moral maturity could track 
cognitive development. The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that moral 
maturity increased as a function of cognitive level (three cognitive 
levels), R(2) = 8.45, ~ < .02. However, unlike earlier studies which 
show moral maturity tracking social development, the present data show 
no relationship between social scores and moral maturity, H(4) = 4.64, ~ 
> .30 (four degrees of freedom because there were five different social 
scores). 
The final implication of Kohlberg's theory was that moral maturity 
can not surpass the supposedly necessary cognitive stages. Kohlberg has 
proposed that formal operations are requ1red for Level III morality. 
Thus, the nine participants who showed formal operations could not show 
moral reasoning beyond their cognitive stage because they were 
functioning at the cognitive level which makes possible the highest 
level of moral reasoning. There were 18 participants who were assessed 
at cognitive level I, not consolidated concrete operations, and 3 who 
were assessed at cognitive level II, not formal operations. 
Theoretically, those who were not concrete operational could not show 
conventional level moral reasoning and those who were not formal 
operational could not show principled moral reasoning. A moral maturity 
score ot 300 or above indicates predominately Level II morality because 
300 is pure stage 3; a score of 500 indicates predominately Level III 
morality. Ot the 21 individuals whose moral reasoning ~ have 
exceeded the supposed ceiling set by cognitive stage, the judgments ot 
eight ~ exceed that ceiling. Is 8 of 21 more than "essentially none" 
of 21? Kohlberg did not identify how many violations may be considered 
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to be essentially none, but by convention it might be assumed he means 
that essentially none is 5 of 100 or, being generous, 10 of 100 or even 
15 of 100. Is 8 of 21 more than 15 of 100? By the Chi square goodness 
ot fit test, 8 of 21 is more than 15 of 100, (1) = 1.2 ~ < .005, 
one-tailed test. 
There were no sex differences in moral reasoning. Exactly half of 
the scores for each sex fell above the median score ot 304. 
D1scussjon Qi &xperiment l 
The finding that participants in Experiment 1 showed cognitive 
development which is delayed as compared to norms for hearing 
individuals was expected and suggests that participants were a 
representative sample of the deaf population. Indeed, based upon the 
deaf developmental literature, any other findings would have been 
suspect. The literature suggests delays but no ceilings. The present 
data corroborate such assertions. 
The finding that there were no differences in role-taking scores of 
those who have and have not reached the stage of consolidated concrete 
·operations was surprising. There are a number of possible explanations 
of why role-taking scores were so high. First, the social instrument 
may not have been adequate to tap social perspective taking development. 
Recall that no independent instrument has been created to assess 
Kohlberg's stages of soc1al development. While the present measure was 
a typ1cal affective role-taking task, it might not have sampled those 
social skills which Kohlberg proposes as being an outcome of cognitive 
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development and necessary for moral development. 
On the other hand, the high affective soc1al scores may be related 
to characteristics of the deaf community. Participants were 
prelingually deaf and thus have a long history of relying solely on 
visual cues to acqu1re information about social situations. Nuances and 
subtleties ot manual communication are typically derived not only from 
the signs but from facial expression and body posture of the signer. 
Deaf people are accustomed to studying facial expressions. In 
retrospect, it might have been surprising to have found other than very 
high scores on the soc1al measure. 
It is also plausible to speculate that the high social scores were 
a function of the fact that all but four participants were or had been 
resident students at schools for the deaf. Kohlberg and P1aget have 
both suggested that social development is accelerated as increasing 
amounts ot time are spent in interactions with peers. Typical hearing 
children have not lived with peers; the children in Experiment 1 have. 
The data substantiate Kohlberg's view that essentially the same 
moral reasoning processes are being tapped regardless of dilemma subject 
matter. Deaf participants seemingly make the same types of judgments of 
peers as they do of hea~ing people, with reasoning constrained by level 
of moral development. The manipulation of modifying some dilemmas to 
portray characters as being deaf did not uncover any differences in 
judgment. 
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The finding that moral maturity of over one-third of participants 
exceeded supposedly necessary cognitive stages was surprising. This 
finding suggests that either the research is not an accurate test of 
Kohlberg's theory, or perhaps the theory has some hithertofore 
undetected weaknesses. It was therefore decided to repeat the research 
with hearing people to see if the assessment measures were a fair test. 
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
It was difficult to interpret the results from deaf participants 
because it was unclear whether the results were an outcome of the 
modified procedures which reduced dependence on language by providing 
possible answers. Therefore, the experiment was repeated with hearing 
participants. Predictions, of course, were the same as those for the 
deaf participants because Kohlberg is clear in stating the necessary 
conditions for moral development: that is, Kohlberg says that cognitive 
development makes possible social development which makes possible more 
sophisticated levels of moral reasoning. 
Method 
Subjects 
Participants were 30 hearing individuals, 10 in each age group of 
10-year-olds, 15-year-olds, and adults (ages 25 to 52). The two younger 
groups were students at Charlotte Latin School who were judged by their 
teachers to be "average" students for their age and grade. The adults 
were administrative and staff personnel (e.g., maintenance staff, public 
safety otficers, and secretaries) at Queens College in Charlotte. 
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Procedure 
Testing was administered in groups of 3, 4, or 5 in private rooms 
at Charlotte Latin (students) or Queens College (adults). The procedure 
was the same as for deaf participants except that the signed videotape 
was not presented and no interpreter was present. 
Materials 
Other than the videotape, the same materials were employed for 
hearing participants as had been used for deaf participants. 
Results 
Scoring was the same as in Experiment I. Results are shown in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
Analyses 
Nine 10-year-olds, all 15-year-olds, and nine adults were scored as 
having achieved at least the stage of consolidated concrete operations. 
These observed results are consistent with expectations based on the 
literature (e.g., G1nsburg & Opper, 1969), (2) = .07, ~ > .05. Hearing 
participants showed levels ot cognitive development which were 
significantly more advanced than the cognitive stages of deaf 
participants, (2) = 19.4, ~ < .001. This finding is consistent with the 
literature which indicates delays in cognitive development of deaf 
individuals as compared with hearing people. 
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Table 3 
Results ot P1agetian Cognitive Tasks (Hearing Participants) 
Subject Mass Wgt. Ser I Ser II Prop Cog. Level 
CLFlOl Yes Yes Yes No No II 
CLb"l02 Yes Yes No No Yes II 
CLF103 Yes Yes No Yes No II 
CLF104 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
CLF105 Yes Yes No Yes No II 
CLM!Ol Yes No No No No I 
CLM102 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
CLM103 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
CLM104 Yes Yes No Yes No II 
CLM105 Yes Yes No Yes No II 
CLF151 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
CLF152 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
CL.!!'l53 Yes Yes Yes No Yes III 
CLF154 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
CLF155 Yes Yes Yes No No II 
CLM151 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
CLM152 Ye's Yes No No No II 
CLM153 Yes Yes No Yes Yes III 
CLM154 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Ill 
CLM155 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Results ot Piagetian Cognitive Tasks (Hearing Participants) 
QAFl Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAF2 Yes Yes No Yes No II 
QM'3 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAF4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAFS Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAMl Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAM2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No III 
QAM3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
QAM4 Yes No No Yes No I 
QAMS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes III 
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Table 4 
Resul~s ot Social and Moral Tasks (Hearing Participants) 
Social Tasks Deaf Dilem. Stnd. Dilem Moral 
Subject Cong. Incong. Caro. Pris. Heinz Bros. Maturity 
CLF101 3 3 4 3 4 2 325 
CLF102 3 3 4 4(3) 4 3 367 
CLF103 3 2 4 3 4(6) 4(6) 409 
CL.I!'104 3 3 4 4(3) 5 4(6) 431 
CLF105 3 2 3(4) 4(3) 4(6) 3 366 
CLM101 3 2 2(3) 1 4 2 233 
CLn102 2 3 4 4(3) 4 3 367 
CLM103 3 1 4 4 4(6) 3(4) 399 
CLM104 3 1 2(3) 4(6) 3 3(4) 332 
CLM105 3 1 4 4 4l6) 3(4) 399 
CLF151 3 1 4 4(6) 5 5 466 
CLF152 3 1 2l3) 4 4 3 333 
CLF153 3 3 4 4 6 5 475 
CLF154 3 2 5l6) 5 4(6) 3(4) 463 
CLF155 3 1 ,, 4(6) 4 5 441 
CL1'1151 3 1 4 4 6 3(4) 433 
CLM152 3 1 4 4 4 3 375 
CLM153 3 1 4 4 4 3 375 
CL1'1154 3 3 5 4(6) 5 5 491 
CLM155 3 2 3(4) 1(2) 3 2 241 
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Table 4 (continued) 
ResulLS ot Social and Moral Tasks (Hearing Participants) 
QA!o'1 3 3 6 4(6) 5 2 441 
QM2 2 0 5(6) 4 5 3 433 
Q~'3 3 0 2(3) 4 2 2 258 
QA!o'4 3 1 5(6) 4(6) 4 2 405 
QM5 2 3 5(6) 4(6) 4 2 405 
QAM1 3 3 5(6) 4 4 4(6) 455 
QAM2 3 3 3(4) 4 5 3(4) 382 
QAM3 3 3 5(6) 6 4(6) 1 430 
QAM4 3 2 2(3) 3 4 2 283 
QAMS 3 2 5(6) 6 4 3 458 
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Contrary to expectations, the Kruskal-Wallis statistic showed no 
differences in social perspective scores as a function of cognitive 
level, H(2) c 1.9, ~ > .30. There were only 35 incorrect answers on the 
social measure (out ot 180 questions). Of the incorrect responses, 32 
were on the incongruous p1ctures, and 16 of these were on the picture of 
the boy being bitten by the dog. This result is similar to that found 
for deaf indiviauals, who answered incorrectly 25 items, 21 of which 
were on the incongruous pictures. Mean social scores of deaf 
participants (5.1) did not differ from those of hearing individuals 
(4.8), t(58) = .968, ~ > .20. 
The Wilcoxon test also revealed no differences in moral reasoning 
ot hearing partic1pants as shown by type of dilemma, i.e., standard vs. 
modified,~= .597, ~ = .28. Median moral maturity scores were 400 for 
the modified dilemmas and 367 for the standard versions. Recall that 
for deaf participants, the median moral maturity scores were 300 for the 
standard versions and 298 for the modified dilemmas. 
The median moxal maturity ot hearing participants was 402, ot deaf 
participants was 304. The median test indicates that the median for 
hearing was greater than that for deaf participants, (1) = 15, ~ < .001. 
As expected, the moral maturity of hearing participants increased 
as a function of cognitive level, H(2) = 7.3, ~ < .05. As with deaf 
participants, the social scores of hearing individuals were not related 
to their moral maturity, H(3) = 4.3, ~ > .10. 
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As predicted, the moral maturity of hearing participants did not 
exceed the supposedly necessary cognitive stages. The moral reasoning 
ot the 19 cognitive level III individuals could not have exceeded their 
cognitive stage because they were functioning at the cognitive stage 
which makes possible principled moral reasoning. Of the 11 whose 
reasoning could have surpassed cognitive stage, none did. 
When the data from both samples are combined, there are 8 moral 
maturity scores which exceed the ceilings set by supposedly necessary 
cognitive stages. All violations come from deaf individuals. The 
Fisher exact probability test shows that in this respect these groups 
are d1fferent 1 ~ = .019. 
As with deaf participants, the median test revealed no sex 
differences in the moral reasoning of hearing individuals, = 2.13, ~ > 
.10, median = 402. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The research showed delays in the cognitive development of deaf 
individuals which are consistent with the deaf developmental literature, 
even though modified cognitive tasks which reduced the importance of 
language competence were used. No deaf 10-year-old participants showed 
evidence of having reached consolidated concrete operations. Three of 
Nine deaf the deaf 15-year-olds were at least concrete operational. 
participants gave evidence of formal reasoning abilities. 
levels for hearing participants were also consistent 
Cognitive 
with levels 
reported in the ex1sting literature for similar ages, even though the 
modified Piagetian cognitive tasks were used. Together, data from these 
experiments suggest that modifying cognitive tasks to reduce expressive 
language requ~rements provided a fair assessment of levels of Piagetian 
cognitive development. This is the first study to compare cognitive 
functioning of deaf and hearing people on Piagetian tasks using a 
technique which minimizes the impact of language competence. It thus 
replicates and extends the literature in showing delays but not ceilings 
for deaf individuals. 
Regarding the relationship between cognitive and moral development, 
Kohlberg has argued that moral reasoning is, after all, reasoning and 
more sophisticated cognitive reasoning abilities make possible but do 
not mandate more sophisticated levels of moral reasoning. The data from 
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these experiments support Kohlberg's view that increases in moral 
maturity are related to increases in cognitive development. 
The moral reasoning of deaf individuals found in this project is 
considerably more advanced than moral levels reported in previous 
research (e.g., De~aro & Emerton, 1978; Nasa, 1964; Peterson, Dow, & 
Savage, 1979), although it still lagged behind that of hearing persons 
of comparable cognitive levels. Eighteen of the deaf participants were 
assessed as possessing Kohlberg's Conventional Level moral reasoning. 
The present findings indicate that characterizations of deaf individuals 
as being rigiu and authority-oriented in their moral reasoning are 
unwarranted. 
The results also substantiate Kohlberg's view that essentially the 
same moral reasoning processes are being tapped regardless ot dilemma 
subject matter. Participants made the same types ot judgments of people 
who seemed similar to themselves as they did of those who were not so 
similar. The manipulation of modifying some dilemmas to portray 
characters as being deaf did not uncover any differences in the levels 
ofjudgment for either sample, as Kohlberg would have predicted. 
The finding that moral maturity of almost one-third of deaf 
participants (but none of the hearing participants) exceeded supposedly 
necessary cognitive stages was surprising. Kohlberg's theory does not 
allow the level of moral reasoning to exceed the necessary cognitive 
stage. Closer inspection of Table 2 shows that 7 of the 8 violations 
came from children who were residential students at schools for the 
deaf. It might be expected that residential students would have a 
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richer social life and have more experience in making moral judgments 
than children who live at home, yet this does not explain how, if 
Kohlberg's assumptions are correct, their reasoning exceeded the 
necessary cognitive stages. And because the cognitive levels shown here 
are consistent with the developmental literature, it can be assumed that 
the assessed cognitive stages are accurate. 
It is almost as if deaf people's moral maturity were related more 
to experience 
reasoning is logical 
reasoning, reflecting 
to cognitive development. Perhaps cognitive 
reasoning while moral reasoning is pragmatic 
experience. It is generally believed that 
Kohlberg's theory is a refinement and extension of Piaget's work, yet 
Kohlberg seems to have made some assumptions which Piaget did not. 
Where Kohlberg argued that there are three separate domains in 
development and the cognitive domain drives the soc1al domain which 
drives the moral domain, Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) was inclined 
to view the domains as being different aspects of gene~al cognitive 
development. Piaget argued that in cognitive development there is 
functional unity which ties together logico-mathematical, playful, 
social, emotional, and moral components into a unified whole. It may be 
inferred from P1aget's position that while there should be reasonably 
parallel development ot the various aspects which comprise cognitive 
development, one aspect does not drive another and there is no 
theoretical reason why one area might not develop at a somewhat faster 
rate than another, depending upon such factors as individual experience. 
Therefore, Piaget would not find the present results surprising. 
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In recent years, there has been growing concern (e.g., Rest, 1979) 
over developing some method of assessing moral development that could be 
administered to groups and which would make scoring more objective. The 
conventional procedure entails individual administration of Kohlberg's 
moral dilemmas. Examiners read the dilemmas and ask the questions aloud 
while writing down the answers as completely as possible. This 
procedure takes considerable time and scoring is necessarily somewhat 
subjective. Rest (1979) has created a Defining Issues Test which 
presents moral d1lemmas in written form and asks participants to rate 12 
statements about each dilemma on a four-point scale of importance. The 
test can be administered to groups and scoring is objective. However, 
the test requ1res considerable language proficiency. Perhaps for this 
reason Rest reported having usea it successfully only with ninth graders 
(ages 13-14) and older (Rest, personal communication, February, 1982). 
The modification ot Kohlberg's procedure used in the present research 
may serve to answer a need. It does sort people on Kohlberg's scales, 
it can be administered to groupa, scoring is objective, it can be used 
with children, and language competence is minimized. 
The finding that there were no differences in role-taking scores of 
those who had and had not reached the stage of consolidated concrete 
operations in either experiment was inconsistent with Kohlberg's theory 
but, in retrospect, is not surprising. It seems likely that the social 
instrument may not have been adequate to tap social perspective-taking 
development. Recall that no independent instrument has been created to 
assess Kohlberg's stages of social development. While the present 
measure was a typ1cal affective role-taking task, it might not have 
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sampled those social skills which Kohlberg proposed as being an outcome 
of cognitive development and necessary for moral 
Participants showed ceiling effects which obscured 
differentiate social development. Participants of 
development. 
attempts to 
all ages and 
cognitive levels were quite adept at ignoring situations and focusing on 
facial expressions to make judgments about emotions. Had the number of 
social pictures been increased or had different pictures been used. 
differences in social scores might have appeared. One picture. the boy 
being bitten by the dog. is apparently ambiguous: 27 of the 60 total 
errors on social scores were on that one picture. Had a picture with a 
clearer emotion been used, social scores would have been even higher. 
Instead ot an affective task. a cognitive-social task which 
requ1res ability to infer intentions or motives might serve as a more 
useful indicator ot soc1al development if language requ1rements could be 
minimized. However, available cognitive-social tasks, such as Flavell's 
nickle-dime problem (Flavell, Botkin. Fry, Wright. & Jarvis. 1968), rely 
qu1te heavily on language for instructions and interpreting results. 
Reducing their language requirements would likely make the tasks 
incomprehensible to deaf people and thus be an unfair assessment of 
their social development. Devising a new social instrument is perhaps 
the most likely solution to this problem. Perhaps a replication of the 
present study with deaf persons which used a different social task might 
be usetul in testing further Kohlberg's view of the separate domains. 
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In addition to testing Kohlberg's theory, the present research was 
designed to add to our understanding of the development of moral 
reasoning in deaf indiviauals. Previous studies have painted a picture 
of poorly developed moral judgments in both deaf children and adults. 
However, those studies requ1red participants to express their reasoning 
in written or oral English, even though English was not their native 
tongue. Native speakers ot English, when learning a foreign language, 
typ1cally find it far easier to express concrete ideas than abstract 
ones (M. Kirby, personal communication, October, 1983). This does not 
mean that the English speaker is necessarily constrained from 
understanding and expressing nuances and subtleties, only that 
abstractions are initially difficult to handle in another language. The 
present manipulation of minimizing the effects of English language 
problems for deaf participants may have freed them to show more 
accurately their attained levels of moral reasoning, unconstrained by 
the necessity of formulating answers in a foreign tongue. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that ability to reason at high 
moral levels means individuals will behave morally. Kohlberg (1969; 
1976) argued that an individual would have a difficult time following 
high moral standards without understanding them or believing in them. 
Thus, for Kohlberg, principled moral behavior requ1res principled moral 
reasoning. Yet the reverse is not true: Principled moral reasoning 
does not require principled moral behavior any more than cognitive 
development requ1res moral reasoning development. It may be necessary, 
but it is not suffic1ent. And, of course, this study might have shown 
different results had behavioral rather than cognitive moral measures 
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been taken. 
procedures to test In summary, the experiments employed modified 
Kohlberg's theory with atypical and typ1cal populations. In some 
Cognitive and moral 
moral development tracks 
respects, the theory held up reasonably well. 
assessments confirmed Kohlberg's view that 
cognitive development, although there was some indication that moral 
development may be influenced by experience. Moral reasoning did not 
differ as a function ot situations depicted by dilemmas. The role of 
social development could not be determined because the soc1al instrument 
was inadequate. However, the data from the present experiments suggest 
that Kohlberg's theory seems valid for deaf individuals. The data also 
indicate that the modified procedures are a useful way of testing 
cognitive and moral development. 
Further research is called for. Specifically, another experiment 
with deaf individuals should be conducted using the cognitive and moral 
tasks to see if the sta~e violations occurred by chance. Second, a 
different social measure should be found or created to test Kohlberg's 
view of a separate social domain. 
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